Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2012

Death in Our Life
Joseph Raz
Columbia Law School, jr159@columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Philosophy
Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph Raz, Death in Our Life, OXFORD LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 25/2012; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 12-305 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1752

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

	
  

Death	
  in	
  Our	
  Life	
  
By	
  	
  
Joseph	
  Raz	
  	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

Abstract: This is the text of the Annual Lecture of the Society for Applied
Philosophy, delivered in Oxford on 22 May 2012. I kept the talk style of
the paper. It examines a central aspect of the relations between duration
and quality of life by considering the moral right to voluntary euthanasia,
and some aspects of the moral case for a legal right to euthanasia. Would
widespread acceptance of a right to voluntary euthanasia lead to
widespread changes in attitudes to life and death? Many of its advocates
deny that, seeing it as a narrow right enabling people to avoid ending
their life in great pain or total dependence, or a vegetative state. I argue
that the right cannot cogently be conceived as a narrow right, confined to
very limited circumstances. It is based on the value of having the
normative power to choose the time and manner of one’s death. Its
recognition will be accompanied by far reaching changes in culture
and attitudes, and these changes will enrich people’s life by enabling them

	
  

to integrate their death as part of their lives.

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

1.	
  

Introductory	
  background	
  	
  
We care about the quality of our life, and we care about its
duration. We care about the quality and duration of the life of others.
These are generalisations of how things are and how they ought to be.
They are not without exceptions. Sometimes we do not care, and
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sometimes (not necessarily the same) we have no reason to care. My
topic is the relation between the two: between concern for the quality
of life and concern for its duration, or more specifically the relations
between the reasons for the two concerns.
That they are interdependent in various ways is obvious, and we
are or can be aware of the connection any time we choose an activity
that involves some risk to our life, a risk greater than that of some
available alternatives, because it is worth it.
It may be tempting to think that we live in order to live well and
that therefore duration is entirely subordinate to quality of life. But that
view is unsustainable. First, there is a stark asymmetry between the
reasons that bear on the life of others and those that bear on the agent’s
own life. There are severe limits to one’s freedom to shorten (without
consent) the life of another even for the sake of the quality of life of that
other. But even regarding one’s own life it would appear reasonable to
forgo benefits in order to extend the duration of one’s life. There is a
good deal of writing aiming to establish the right balance between quality
and duration, perhaps in ways that secure a greater benefit to the person
concerned over all. For reasons that may be apparent from
other work of mine, but that will remain unexplored today, I tend to
doubt most of the conclusions so reached. While caring for longevity
with no quality may be irrational, as are attitudes that ignore the
inherent implications of one’s choices and commitments, for the most
part it seems plausible to hold that there is no right balance. Much
seems to be a matter of non-reason-based attitudes, which need not be
long enduring ones. For good or ill, this will be the background for my
observations today.
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The relations, and potential conflict, between duration and quality
of our life is most dramatically before us when considering, practically or
theoretically, voluntary euthanasia. My talk today is not about the
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia (and I will consider that to include
mercy killing at the request of the dying as well as assisted suicide, and
many of the considerations I mention apply to suicide as well).
Legalisation involves many practical difficulties that I will not discuss. I
	
  

will consider some aspects of the morality of voluntary euthanasia to
illustrate the tangle of connections between concern for the duration
and concern for the quality of life. And naturally, what I will say has a
bearing on the way we think of voluntary euthanasia as an independent
issue. I will suggest that our attitude to voluntary euthanasia has wide
implications, that it affects fundamental aspects of the kind of societies
we live in, and therefore also the opportunities and limits we encounter
in them.

	
  

	
  

2.	
  	
   A	
  note	
  on	
  the	
  limitations	
  of	
  a	
  right	
  of	
  conscientious	
  objection	
  
Perhaps I could start with a small point, illustrating the direction
of travel rather than the main question that I want to examine. In
considering voluntary euthanasia I will consider both the case for a
moral right and the (moral) case for a legal right to voluntary euthanasia.
Their scope need not be identical, as a variety of considerations, both
principled and practical, may suggest that the legal right could be wider

	
  

in some respects and narrower in others. Most obviously its
administration may require conforming to certain preconditions that are
not part of the moral right itself. Furthermore, the legalisation of
voluntary euthanasia may mean no more than that engaging in or

	
  

	
  

assisting with it would be lawful activities incurring no legal disapproval
of any kind. It may also mean that under certain conditions publicly
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provided administrative and medical services would be required to assist
in its administration. Given my aim in this talk, except for my next
comment, I will not consider the case for this positive assistance by
public bodies or at public expense.
Assume that we are resolved to legalise some form of regulated
voluntary euthanasia (and whenever I refer to euthanasia I will be
referring to voluntary euthanasia only). The law would entitle people
who met certain conditions to assistance in committing suicide. They
might even have a right to be killed on request – always subject to
certain procedural and substantive conditions. Now, assume that this
would impose institutional requirements on some medical and other
bodies to provide such a service. Needless to say, some people will have
deep reservations about taking any part in the preparation for or the
performance of euthanasia, and I am going to assume that such people
	
  

	
  

will be able to avail themselves of a conscientious objection exception to
any duty to participate.
But those who object to euthanasia will not find such an exception
satisfactory. I mean that they would not find it adequate to the task that
conscientious exceptions are meant to serve, namely enabling people
not to suffer serious disadvantage by living according to their moral
convictions. For one thing, those who will claim conscientious objection
will find their employment opportunities restricted. Given the public
duty to provide the institutional facilities required by law for people to
be able to avail themselves of their (legal) right to a regulated euthanasia,
those who have conscientious reservations may be disadvantaged in
various ways. For example, they will not be able to obtain or keep jobs if
doing so will make it difficult for people to avail themselves of the right
to euthanasia. Furthermore, the objectors will point out that they object
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not merely to active participation in administering the right, but also to
living in a society where euthanasia is legal, with all the implications that
will have for public attitudes to death and dying.
Such objections are familiar from other areas of legal reforms such
as abortion, gay adoptions and gay marriages. In as much as the
objections are based on a claimed personal right of the conscientious
exception kind, both objections fail. No one has an unconditional right
to be a medical practitioner. One has a right to a fair opportunity to
become a medical practitioner provided one is able and willing to
	
  

perform the duties that go with jobs for which medical skills are needed.
The conscientious exemption from a duty to participate in
administering the right is allowed because, and so long as, it does not
threaten the provision of the service. Therefore, if many otherwise
qualified medical practitioners claim the exemption, they will not be able
to get medical jobs. Those will go to people willing to provide the
service. The same considerations apply to administrative and other staff
involved in the administration of a right to voluntary euthanasia.
I will shortly examine the character of the public culture likely in a
society that recognises a right to voluntary euthanasia. At the moment
we are considering the claim by some people that they are entitled not
to live in such a society because they find its public culture deeply
objectionable. They object to the society because of its moral character.
But the right they claim is that those who do not share their
condemnation of the society should nevertheless avoid encouraging it in
order to spare them the necessity of living in such a society. This is a

	
  

self-protecting attitude, not to be confused with the demand that others
should conform to the principles one holds dear for their own sake, or
for the sake of truth, god, or anything like that. Yet it cannot be
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respected except by forcing others into living under a public culture that
they in turn will find deeply objectionable. And one’s objection to a
condition cannot warrant subjecting others to the same condition. A
degree of local separation of neighbourhoods can provide some
accommodation, but in principle the objection cannot be accommodated.
It is a conflict of reasons in which the conscientious objectors lose.
So if one is justified in legalising euthanasia then widespread
consequences for professional and occupational opportunities and for
the public culture can be expected to follow, and cannot be objected to.
But while such claims to personal exemption must be rejected in
principle, they have considerable practical force, and they have to be
taken seriously in deliberating about whether the legalisation of
euthanasia should be undertaken at the present time, and how it should
be regulated: these decisions should depend in part on the degree of
aggravation the legalisation of euthanasia will cause to sections of the
population, and on the size of those sections.
	
  

	
  

3.	
  	
   The	
  narrow	
  rationale	
  view	
  
There is, of course, another, more direct, way in which the
objection to the public culture that will prevail once euthanasia is
legalised may constitute an objection to legalisation. It need not be
advanced as a claim based on a personal difficulty in living in a society
with a certain public culture. It may be an objection to that public
culture based on its reprehensible character. For example, it is often said
that if voluntary euthanasia were legalised the elderly would be under
pressure to opt for it to spare their friends and relatives the need to

	
  

	
  

care for them, or in order to let the beneficiaries of their wills inherit
sooner rather than later, or more rather than less.
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Let it be assumed that some such consequences would follow the
legalisation of euthanasia and that they are undesirable. We will return
to this question later. The issue we must face now is whether they do
constitute a sound objection (a) to legalisation, or even more radically
(b) to the case for a (moral) right to voluntary euthanasia.
I will assume that the case for the legalisation of euthanasia is
based not on an alleged public good that it will secure (reducing the cost
to the public of providing medical services?), but on a claim of an
individual right to have the option of voluntary euthanasia at least under
some conditions. It would seem to follow that if the adverse
consequences attributed to legalisation are a result of an abuse of the
legal right that legalisation will establish, they constitute a case against
	
  

	
  

the legal recognition of the moral right to euthanasia, but they do not
count against the existence of that right.
Some would indeed argue that these adverse consequences
cannot be more than the result of abusing the law, and that the proper
reaction to the abuse is to protect people from it, to couple the
legalisation of euthanasia with protections against its abuse. Any reform
brings with it new opportunities for abuse. They should not be allowed
to stop reform where reform is otherwise justified, it will be claimed.
Though one should do one’s best to fight the abuses.
So long as one allows that the prospect of abuse may affect the
timing and manner of reform this seems an appropriate response to the
risk of abuse. But are the pressures that legalised voluntary euthanasia
will impose on the elderly nothing but a result of abuse of the law, and

	
  

	
  

of the moral principles underlying it? Here is an argument suggesting that
this pressure will not be entirely due to possible abuse, that in part these
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anticipated pressures are legitimate consequences of legalised voluntary
euthanasia:
A legal right to voluntary euthanasia provides people with an
option they do not currently have, the option of deciding on the time
and conditions of their own death even when they can no longer
commit suicide unaided. We would not only expect, we should
encourage people to use that option for good reasons. People who
become aware that they are losing the affection and good will of their
friends and relations may well consider that they will be better off
availing themselves of the new option so as to retain their reputation
with members of their families after they die. People’s self-interest,
those who would reason in that way assume, does not end with the end
of their life. People have an interest in their posthumous reputation. It is
therefore not an abuse to provide them with reasons to use the option
to die in a way that will serve their posthumous reputation.
This is a somewhat crass argument. But why? Perhaps because it
rests on a misunderstanding of the rationale of the right to voluntary
euthanasia. Perhaps its rationale is to protect people, not all people, but
many, from being condemned to live a life not worth living. There are
various ways in which one may conceive of the relations between the
right to euthanasia and escaping a life not worth living. To keep matters
simple I will describe two: the pure and the mixed variations of the lifenot-worth-living thesis as I shall call them. Both deny that the right
aims to provide people with an option that can be rationally chosen for
any reason for preferring death to continuing alive.
According to the pure view, the rationale for the right is to spare
people from having to carry on living once their life is not worth living
anymore. But the right aims to spare people this fate in a way that
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protects them from mistaken application of that rationale, and from
being taken advantage of by unscrupulous misuse of it. That is why each
one of us is given the sole power to decide when to ask for euthanasia.
Acting rationally one would choose not to carry on living once life is no
longer worth living, and only then. And the fact that each one of us has
the sole power to decide when that point is reached minimises mistaken
applications of the right, and protects people from abuse, the abuse of a
power to decide when life has become not worth living that would have
occurred had that power been entrusted to some public authority or to
relatives, etc.
The mixed view differs in allowing that people may have cogent
reasons against opting for euthanasia even if their lives are not worth
living. They may, for example, be attached to people for whom their
death would be a great loss. Or, they may believe that they have reasons
against euthanasia, which while not cogent they may rationally believe to
be valid. They may, e.g., have religious beliefs that, while false, are not
irrational for them to hold. Like the pure view, the mixed one sees the
point of the right to euthanasia in offering the option of escaping a life
	
  

	
  

not worth living, but unlike it, it does not assume that it is always best to
take advantage of the option.
Both views see the rationale of the right to euthanasia in providing
an escape from a life not worth living, and both see the case for providing
this escape route in the fact that such a life is bad for those whose life it
is. Therefore, both views deny that one has such a right whenever one’s
reasons for ending one’s life are better than the reasons for not ending it,
let alone that one has a right to euthanasia, or even to suicide, which

	
  

	
  

is unconditional and can be properly used whenever one chooses to do
so.
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4.	
  	
   Euthanasia	
  and	
  a	
  life-‐-‐-‐not-‐-‐-‐worth-‐-‐-‐living	
  
The problem is that both versions of the ‘life-not-worth-living’
thesis are flawed. First, both focus on the outcome – the avoidance of a
life not worth living, regarding the right to euthanasia as justified by the
fact that it is a good way of securing the outcome. In doing so neither
finds intrinsic value in the right itself, or in the choice that it secures.
Second, both assume that one should use the right to euthanasia only if
one’s life is of a kind that can be correctly described ‘a life not worth
living’.
I will address the second criticism first. As you will have gathered from my
opening remarks I readily acknowledge that some lives are better, enjoy
greater levels of well-being, than others – just think of lives of pain, or of
repression and the frustrations and suffering it induces, or of self- hatred,
self-loathing, etc. and compare them with lives that are relatively free
from these manifestations. Yet for the most part there is no truth

	
  

of the matter as to which life is better.
Even if this bold assertion, which cannot be justified or explored here, is
true, it is possible that while only relatively few comparative judgements
are true, important non-comparative ones are, and can be known to be,
true. In particular, possibly there are kinds of life that are not worth
living. I would not wish to deny that. The question is, or one question is,
is the narrow rationale view of the right to voluntary euthanasia based
on that fact? I think that it is not, for the standard arguments for a
narrow understanding of the case for euthanasia apply beyond cases of a
life not worth living.
Typically at least four conditions are often thought to justify voluntary
euthanasia: (a) a life without consciousness, known as a vegetative life,
(b) a life of unremitting great pain, (c) a life of total dependence on others,
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(d) a life of greatly diminished mental capacities (severe loss of memory,
absence of linguistic capacity, unremitting severe mental distress, fear
etc.). The vegetative life is not worth living. That is an easy case, for it is
barely an animate life at all. It is a vegetative life, and the reasons to
preserve inanimate life based on its intrinsic value are not very strong.
Regarding the last three, matters are much less clear.
Some people do prefer, or think that they will prefer, even a life of pain,
or of dependence, to death, and I do not know what mistake they are
making. But if they are not making any mistake then perhaps their choice
is self-vindicatory – their life is (for them) worth living. Yet this may not
be the right conclusion to draw because other people do choose death
over a life of unremitting pain or over a life of dependency. I do not
	
  

know what mistake they are making either. Assume that neither makes
any mistake. It cannot be that their life is both worth living and not
worth living. Could it be that it is worth living for those who choose to
live and not worth living for those who choose to die?

	
  

Of course, those who choose to die may well say that they do so
because they find their life not worth living. But possibly this is merely an
expression of their preference rather than a specification of a reason for
it. Or, it may be no more than an expression of the kind of preference
they have: they prefer death to this life not in order to benefit others
but because of the quality of the life that they can expect. If so then their
use of the term does not vindicate the idea that there is a kind of life

	
  

that is not worth living.
That idea assumes that life may have a quality that, for any human being,
renders it not-worth-living. (And I assume that being “not worth living”
is inconsistent with being “worth living”). Preferences to live or to die
can therefore be justified or criticised by whether they reject or fail to
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reject a life that is not worth living. But if that is the notion of a life
worth living we have in mind then it fails to apply to a life of total
dependency or of unremitting pain. Such a life is not ‘not-worth-living’
and yet it may well justify voluntary euthanasia, or so its advocates claim.
In reaching this conclusion I have relied on the assumption that some
may prefer to die rather than have a life of, say total dependence, while
others may prefer to remain alive, without either making any mistake.
But is the assumption justified? Of course, some such preferences may
be irrational or be based on false assumptions, e.g. that one is subject to
a divine command to choose one way or the other. But they need not
be. People in the conditions imagined may have some reasons to remain
alive: they could, if they try, savour the good of being in the world,
experience and observe some of it. And they may be able to retain or
even develop valuable relations with others. Some would not find that
these reasons outweigh the reasons – of pain, sense of humiliation and
others – for ending their lives. But this is another context in which I
believe that the conflicting reasons are incommensurate, and either
decision is – or can be (depending on the details of the circumstances,
and the way it is taken) reasonable or justified.
An interim conclusion: I am considering the case of a narrow rationale
for a right to voluntary euthanasia. There could be a limited right to
voluntary euthanasia that applies only to vegetative life on the ground
that that is not a life worth living. But the typical claim for recognition of
a right to voluntary euthanasia that applies to lives of unremitting pain,
	
  

or total dependence, or greatly reduced capacities cannot rely on the
notion of a life not worth living, for it is false that such lives are not
worth living.
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5.	
  	
   Right	
  to	
  euthanasia	
  and	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  life	
  
If there is a right to voluntary euthanasia with the scope its
advocates commonly espouse it must rest on a different rationale.
Moreover, in casting doubt on the possibility that the right can be based
on a case for providing people with the option to escape from a life not
worth living we also, indirectly, raise doubt about the possibility of its
being based on the case for an option of ending one’s life because of its
poor intrinsic quality, understood as a low level of well-being. In
examining the case for that possibility, namely for a right based on the
poor level of well-being one would enjoy (but that falls short of
constituting a life not worth living) a natural way to proceed is to relate
it to a low level of well-being that makes preferring death reasonable. It

	
  

may be the case that the reasons for carrying on living that the quality of
life one would enjoy provides do not defeat the reasons one has for
ending one’s life because of its poor quality. So the low well-being does
not constitute a decisive or conclusive reason for ending one's life, but it
makes that option reasonable.

	
  

The difficulties with this approach are considerable.
First, it would open the door wide to requests for euthanasia well
beyond the standard cases. People who dishonoured themselves do
sometimes commit suicide to escape a life of shame, or of self-hatred,
and so on and so forth. I am sure that some advocates of voluntary
euthanasia would deny that a desire to escape a life of shame and
dishonour makes a decision to end one’s life reasonable. But I do not
believe that there is a cogent case for such a conclusion. Again, there is
not much that I can say, given the limited time, other than that I do not
believe that there are compelling objections to the view that people may
reasonably feel or believe that there is no point to carrying on. The
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explanatory reasons for such feelings/beliefs may or may not include
normative reasons. But either way they may be beyond criticism. (Which
does not of course mean that there is anything amiss with trying to
change the mind of those who actually feel that way.) It is true that in
various cultures some views or other about what makes such choices
reasonable are common. However, without a good case for supporting
them it would be wrong to base a moral conclusion merely on the
prevalence of such views.
A similar charge of arbitrariness would be my reply to those who
may develop a case for the right to euthanasia not from an assessment
	
  

of quality of life or level of well-being generally but on specific conditions
needed to justify the right. It may be argued, e.g., that severe pain makes
a choice of ending one’s life reasonable even for people whose overall
quality of life is quite high. Again, many will, in those circumstances,
prefer to stay alive, but those who prefer dying need not be
unreasonable in their choice. The charge of arbitrariness is raised not
against recognising the significance of pain, but against underplaying the
significance of damaged self-respect, of feelings of guilt for having
betrayed what is most dear to one, feelings of hopelessness about ever
forming deep relations with others, and other conditions that lead
people to prefer dying. All of these, and many others, when wellfounded, render a choice for dying reasonable because of the quality of
the life one will have.
A second objection to the poor quality of life condition is the
arbitrariness of excluding other kinds of reasons from the scope of the
right. In cultures known to me suicide is approved of most, sometimes
celebrated, if committed for the sake of others, or in pursuit of a noble
cause. Of the many examples let me just mention the real and fictional
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people who committed suicide when, during WWII, they fell into the
hands of the Gestapo, and did so to avoid betraying colleagues under
torture. Cases of this kind are not mentioned in discussions of
euthanasia presumably because those discussions are limited to
occasions in which people are physically unable to commit suicide
unaided. But while it may well be that assistance at public expense
should be limited to people unable to end their life on their own there is
no reason to think that the moral right to be assisted is limited in that
way.
	
  

	
  

6.	
  	
   A	
  respect-‐-‐-‐based	
  right	
  
I am exploring the possibility that a right to euthanasia is limited to
a special class of cases, for example to the four categories I mentioned
earlier, and that the rationale for the right and for its limited scope is
based on the reasonableness of choosing to die for reasons to do with
the quality of one’s expected life. My conclusion is that quality of life
considerations, first, will not limit the right in the ways that its advocates
sometimes assume, and second, they cannot be the only considerations
on which the right is based.
This last observation brings me back to the second objection to
the life-not-worth-living thesis that was so far left unexamined. I
remarked that the thesis misses out on the significance of having a right
to euthanasia, and regards it as merely a way of minimising abuses,
minimising the number of cases in which euthanasia occurred, or
pressure for it to take place was exercised, when it should not have
been. Following a familiar line of thought, I would like now to suggest
that we are concerned with a right to euthanasia because the ability to
choose how and when one’s life will end is valuable in itself. Its value
provides an alternative basis for the right to euthanasia.
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This thought echoes the considerations that also underlie the right
to life, or the duty not to kill people – for our purposes it does not
matter whether the duty derives from the right or not. What does
matter is that the duty is one we have regarding all persons in virtue of
their being persons. Disregarding disagreements about what it is about
persons that warrants having a duty not to kill them, I will assume that
the duty derives from the fact that persons are rational beings, creatures
possessing the powers of rational agency. When the duty conflicts with
others the resolution of the conflict, if it has any, depends on additional
considerations, and possibly the expected quality of people’s lives is
among them. But it is not the ground of the duty.
The capacity for rational agency, I will join many in assuming, is the
basis of a duty to respect those who have it, a respect that extends,
within certain bounds, to the exercise of that capacity, namely to the
	
  

way people lead their lives. And that includes its exercise to determine
when and how to end one’s life. Having that option is valuable, and
therefore it is protected by the right to euthanasia. The right to life
protects people from the time and manner of their death being
determined by others, and the right to euthanasia grants each person
the power to choose themselves that time and manner.
In shifting attention to the significance of the right to euthanasia I
do not mean to imply that there are no reasons for euthanasia that are
not involved with it, not a result of it. We have reasons to end the life of
animals of any species to save them from the misery of extreme pain at
the end of their lives, and in some circumstances these would apply to
human beings as well. But when it comes to rational agents, the duty to
respect their rational powers, and protect their ability to use them,
modifies the implications of quality of life considerations: they become
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matters to be considered by each person regarding their own lives.
Others have to respect their decisions. Contemporary claims for a right
to euthanasia are claims to this right-based approach. They recognise
that there are quality of life reasons for ending life, but take them to be
matters over which each person has sovereign power to decide his or
her course. And if nothing else then that sovereignty means that the
right can be exercised for a variety of reasons, and also for presumed
reasons that are either no reasons at all, or not adequate to justify
ending one’s life.
	
  

	
  

7.	
  	
   Death	
  in	
  our	
  life	
  
Those who deny a moral right to euthanasia fear that legalisation
of limited and regulated euthanasia will be the thin end of a substantial
wedge. As you see, I believe that there is something to that fear.
Believing as I do in a right to euthanasia you may expect me to favour
the legalisation of a sweeping, broadly defined right. But that is not so.
As we know, for a non-technical law – one we expect to be known by

	
  

and relied on by the public at large – to succeed it has to be understood,
at least in a rough and ready way, and to be consonant with broadly
accepted attitudes. Possibly this would be true of a narrowly defined
legalisation of euthanasia, but clearly not regarding broadly conceived
legalisation. Where I differ from ‘thin end of the wedge’ opponents of
legalisation is in welcoming shifts of public opinion towards a broader
right, which they fear.
I left untouched many questions regarding the scope of the moral
right. Instead I will conclude with some reflections about the ways in
which it would be good if attitudes to death changed.
The clear difference between what I called the narrow and the
broad right to euthanasia is that the latter takes it to protect not only
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the option to escape certain undesirable conditions at the end of one’s
life, but also and primarily to protect an option to shape the way one’s
life ends, by deciding on its time and manner. And inevitably shaping
one’s dying contributes to giving shape, contributes to the form and
meaning one’s life has. Those who reflect, plan and decide on the
manner of their dying make their dying part of their life. And if they do
	
  

so well then by integrating their dying into their life they enrich their life.
But do I not exaggerate? Interestingly, while the debate about
voluntary euthanasia has a contemporary air, it relates to traditional
ideals first about good ways of dying and second about a good time to

	
  

die.
Various religious and other popular views of life relate a human life
to a task or several tasks and a cycle of preparation, different stages of
achievement, and then relative retirement from active involvement or
pursuits. Typically they see death as regrettable or lamentable if it
happens before the final stage of retirement, but natural and acceptable
when it happens at that stage. Grief will accompany it whenever it
happens, grief over the loss of a person who or whose presence was
significant to those now left without it. But concerning those who die
after the time for achievement is over the grief will be accompanied by
knowledge that the deceased had his or her life, and whether it turned
out well or not, there is nothing that can change it now. The time is ripe
to die. The ideal form of death is often taken to be dying in the presence
of close friends and relations, being reconciled to the appropriateness of
the arriving death.
Such conceptions of when and how to die are still widespread but
they are weakened if not undermined by radically different ideas about
what people may properly strive to accomplish in their lives, and by the
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radical increase of life expectancy. We are used to thinking that people
can find different content to their life: a second or third career,
voluntary involvement with charities, political organisations, or other
more personal pursuits. So that until one’s health radically fails there is
no end to the phase of achievement. Alongside that change, a more
radical change became dominant in many circles, according to which
continuation of life is more or less unconditionally good, whatever kind
of life one has.
I mention these shifts of culture and opinion because recognition
of a right to euthanasia is likely to boost the old traditional ideas, albeit
in a contemporary form. This is beautifully illustrated by Eddy Terstall’s
2004 Dutch film Simon, in which the dying scene is a celebration of
Simon and his life. There are no moral or normative recipes for the
correct and valuable use of the power to shape one’s dying. It is not
inherently limited to the standard cases of euthanasia, or to euthanasia at
all. With time the practice may spread to suicide, assisted suicide, or
consensual killing of people who are not dependent on external help, but
choose to use it. Participation itself may acquire a bonding meaning.
Meaning is socially dependent and develops with changing circumstances.
But decisions on time and form of dying must remain marginal to
our life – mortality may be a major factor influencing the duration, shape
and content of human enterprises, and imaginative reflection and
fantasies of dying also play an important role; our own dying, however,
stands outside any of our personal attachments and pursuits.
Can it be otherwise? Can it be inherent in any personal ambition
that it culminates in dying? Of course. But, assuming that such pursuits
and ambitions are bound to remain of marginal appeal, I will not
speculate whether any of them may have any merit.
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The main way in which making death part of our life by giving us
greater control over its time and manner changes our life is not,
however, by its impact on specific attachments or pursuits. The main
impact is likely to be more pervasive and diffuse. Consciousness of death
and fear of dying - a separate factor, to be sure, but one that in our life is
hard to separate from knowledge of our mortality - have a way of
colouring much of our life, and the changing attitude I am envisaging will
likewise affect our life, real and imaginative, in multifarious and diffuse
ways. So, while the power to decide the time and manner of one’s death,
when wisely used, will contribute to the value of various episodes in
one’s life, the main positive effect I have in mind is of the full, guiltless
acceptance of the power itself. It can transform one’s perspective on
one’s life; reduce the aspects of it from which one is alienated, or those
that inspire a sense of helplessness or terror. It is a change that makes
one whole in generating a perspective, a way of conceiving oneself and
one’s life free from some of those negative aspects.
An important area where control over the time and manner of
our dying may make a significant difference is in its impact on others.
This is a cause of concern for many when contemplating legalising
euthanasia. Would not people be driven to shorten their life in order to
spare others the burden of caring for them, and so on? Perhaps it is
possible to classify the main other-regarding concerns into four central
or standard categories: (1) sparing the effort and distress that looking
after ailing people causes those who are personally involved in looking
after them; (2) preventing one’s savings from being used up on medical
and other forms of care, in order to have more to leave by one’s will;
(3) saving the public the expense of providing medical, nursing and other
publicly provided care; (4) preventing the memory people one cares
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about will have of one being of a person in decline. There are other
cases, but I will use these four as an illustration of the wider
phenomenon.
What should we think about decisions based on these
considerations? Before we come to that we should distinguish that
question from the related but distinct question of when is it appropriate
for people to point out that one may be advised to ask for assistance in
committing suicide, or in any way put moral or psychological pressure
on one to opt for euthanasia in order to achieve one or more of these
goals? Clearly, improper pressure may be applied with a view to taking
advantage of people’s fragility. But what constitutes improper pressure
depends in part on whether these considerations are appropriate in the
first place.
I see no reason to think that they are not. In contexts other than
euthanasia it is common to laud people who committed suicide for the
good of others, or for the public good: the person who threw himself on
a grenade to absorb the impact of its explosion and save the people
hiding alongside him, or indeed the other soldiers in the trench, was one
of the heroic, semi-mythical, figures of my youth, and people setting out
on suicidal military missions were also admired in many cultures.
Similarly, it is acknowledged that there is a limit to the amount of public
resources that it is appropriate to spend on any single individual. This
view is incorporated most explicitly in the practice, far from perfect as it
is, of NICE but deserves a more general and explicit incorporation into
public practices.
Now it seems to me that if public bodies are right in limiting the
resources to be spent on keeping me alive I should acknowledge that
their decision is right, and in appropriate circumstances I should apply
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similar standards in deciding for myself how much others should sacrifice
in order to keep me alive. It is important, in considering these matters,
to remember that most people’s lives are enmeshed with the life of
others, and that it is important that decisions of life and death should be,
if possible, shared. But that does not diminish the importance
of the other-regarding considerations I am discussing, and some of them,
	
  

	
  

by their nature, make a shared decision difficult.
I am saying this in full awareness of the fact that it is a view that
does not find much support in public opinion at the moment. This
recognition is double edged. On the one hand it points to the fact that
the legalisation of euthanasia, if achieved, will be implemented in
conditions where the public is not fully in agreement with its true moral
justification, and that may be a severe problem in the way the legalised
right is administered, and practised. It is the sort of factor that makes
one inclined to wonder whether the time for legalisation has arrived?
Maybe the underhand, inconsistent and informal practices in various
hospitals are the best we can have right now? Yet on the other hand, it
makes one wonder whether we do not need a decisive step, like a
limited legalisation of euthanasia, with strong protections against abuse,
at the present time in order to refocus the debate in ways that would
lead to a more radical reorientation of our attitudes to death, and to a
saner willingness to integrate our dying as an event in our lives.
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